This article examines the evolving policy context of municipal open-space acquisition in New Jersey. The authors hypothesize that voters' interest in open-space protection is sensitive to changes in state policy and that municipal acquisition may have exclusionary effects. The authors examine local acquisition practices using three different approaches: voting behavior, municipal acquisition, and parcel-level characteristics of acquired lands. They find that support for preservation is responsive to growth pressures and changing state policy environments. They also present evidence that municipalities are targeting land able to accommodate higher-density development in their preservation efforts and that municipalities that preserve open space are also active in transferring away their affordable housing obligations.
through regulatory land-use controls and infrastructure decisions, these protections are not permanent and subject to future policy changes. As a consequence, local governments seem increasingly willing to spend public dollars to acquire land in fee simple ownership or to purchase development rights (conservation easements) on private land to protect land permanently from development. These acquisition efforts have seen tremendous growth in numbers and success in recent years (Hollis and Fulton 2002) . The Trust for Public Land's "LandVote" database tallies 1,527 successful local and state votes for land preservation financing from 1988 to 2006, with nearly $44 billion of approved financing for acquisition and preservation (Trust for Public Land 2006) .
In a 1998 statewide referendum, New Jersey voters overwhelmingly approved (66% voting yes) an amendment to the New Jersey Constitution dedicating $1 billion to open-space preservation efforts over 10 years. As of January 2006, all 21 New Jersey counties and 218 of 566 municipalities had voter-approved taxes to fund land-acquisition programs. This represents an increasing demand to use financial mechanisms as either a substitute for or complement to zoning and other local land regulations to provide permanent protection of lands from development.
The purposes of this article are to examine the evolving policy environment for open-space preservation to understand the evolution of state and local financing mechanisms and voter behavior and to question whether increased open-space acquisition-like many local land-use policies in the United States-may be exclusionary in its effect. Why is it that voters seem to have become increasingly willing to increase their own taxes to fund local land preservation efforts?
Within the research literature, a series of recent efforts have attempted to explain evolving demand for local government land-acquisition efforts and open-space ballot measures but without consensus as to the causes and consequences (Bates and Santerre 2001; Howell-Moroney 2004a , 2004b O'Driscoll 2006; Romero and Liserio 2002; Romero 2004; Solecki, Mason, and Martin 2004) . This literature on open-space preservation policies has tended to analyze open-space preservation policy decisions as distinct policy arenas, separate from the context of other local government land-use planning and regulatory strategies. Despite the fact that both regulatory (zoning, development controls) and incentive (transferable development rights or TDRs) mechanisms exist to preserve land, acquisition is an increasing popular option. Daniels (2005) argues that land preservation has become increasingly popular and important because local citizens and land trusts are frustrated with the inability of local regulatory and incentive strategies to achieve the desired level of permanent land preservation. This article is organized as follows: Section 2 describes a theoretical approach to understanding municipal open-space acquisition behavior and reviews previous research literature. Section 3 outlines the mechanics of state and municipal policies and financing mechanisms for open-space preservation in New Jersey. Section 4 describes our specific research hypotheses and the data utilized. Sections 5 and 6 present empirical results on municipal voting and municipal acquisition policies, while section 7 tests whether open-space acquisition efforts are exclusionary. We conclude with some policy implications.
Explaining Municipal Open-Space Acquisition Policies
Understanding the growth in local land preservation efforts and increasing support for dedicated open-space financing is a function of explaining the evolution of voter and resident preferences as they interact with evolving state and local policy environments. Throughout American history, those who have moved to suburban and exurban areas have been drawn by-and vigorously defended-a landscape aesthetic of open spaces, lower densities, and an idealized vision of rural life (Rome 2001; Stilgoe 1988 ). There has always been a strong demand for open spaces in suburban landscapes. Accompanying the traditional suburban taste for open spaces was a desire to keep public expenditures and taxes low. What is remarkable in recent years, therefore, has been voters' increasing willingness to raise their own taxes to acquire lands for open space.
The planning profession has long incorporated open-space planning as a central component of the process of managing urban development (Schmidt 2008a) . Providing open spaces catered to middle-class suburban aspirations toward upper-class country estates (Hayden 2003) . Beginning with the earliest master-planned suburban communities, such as Olmsted and Vaux's Riverside, Illinois, developers of suburban housing provided significant open spaces in both yards and parks. These ideals of detached houses with setbacks, wide yards, and tree-lined streets were later codified in zoning and subdivision regulations. Idealized suburban landscapes incorporated at least three distinct but related forms of open space: private open space in lawns; public open space in parks, trails, parkways, and so forth; and nearby privately owned undeveloped land in farms or forests.
Codes providing for minimum lot sizes, yard and setback requirements, and open-space set-asides have, over the past 50 or so years, increased the amount of open land on each development parcel (Evenson and Wheaton 2003; Fischel 2004) . As active local government financing for permanent open-space preservation through acquisition has only recently gained broad support, we suggest that voters have come to view these regulatory protections of undeveloped land as inadequate. We posit that open-space acquisition can thus serve as a complement or supplement to other regulatory approaches of preserving undeveloped land.
There are three general approaches to explain voters' recent interest in open-space protection through dedicated funding. First, we can attribute such policies to an intensification of or widespread acceptance of environmental awareness in response to the rapid pace of suburban development and its attendant degradation or destruction of landscapes (Lubell, Feiock, and Ramirez 2005; McQueen and McMahon 2003; O'Driscoll 2006; Rome 2001; Romero and Liserio 2002; Wassmer and Lascher 2006) . Open-space preservation support, in this view, may be the result of an increased environmental consciousness that has resulted in changed ideologies and a willingness to vote for spending increases.
A second way to interpret the rise of open-space preservation funding is within the context that sees local land-use planning tools as designed to protect the real estate interests of existing homeowners. A large and growing literature suggests that local homeowners exert political influence to control local land-use decisions to protect and enhance their own property values (Fischel 2001) . In states such as New Jersey, where municipal boundaries are fixed, open-space preservation reduces the supply of potentially developable land. This supply constraint raises the value of existing homes. Additionally, open space is positively capitalized into existing home values because of its amenity value (Crompton 2004; McConnell and Walls 2005) . Fiscal impact studies suggest that population growth and real estate development (particularly residential) can be fiscally harmful to local governments (Burchell and Listokin 1992) . Thus, preserving open-space land from development can provide significant fiscal benefits to existing residents. These three channels (scarcity effect, amenity effect, and fiscal effect) mean that open-space preservation is likely to increase the value of existing homes.
Land trusts and local environmental groups have used both the "environmental consciousness" and the "home-value protection" arguments in framing the debate over open-space preservation under the rubric of quality of life and place (Schmidt 2008b ). Advocates point not only to the environmental impacts of development but also the fiscal impacts. In urging greater open-space preservation, activists also point to the vicissitudes of local zoning. In interviews with local land preservation activists, we found strong beliefs that developers find ways to develop through variances, rezonings, legal proceedings to challenge local zoning, or through well-financed campaigns in local political elections.
A third explanation for the rise of financing mechanisms for land acquisition is the changing legal environment. As a result of U.S. Supreme Court decisions and actions in many state courts and state legislatures to require compensation to landowners for development restrictions on their property, local policy makers increasingly face the choice of compensating landowners for development restrictions or waiving these restrictions (H. Jacobs 2007; H. M. Jacobs 2008). However, if open space is acquired through voluntary financial transactions from a willing seller, legal claims of "regulatory takings" can be avoided. As regulatory options for preserving land face challenge, municipalities are turning to voluntary methods (Wright and Czerniak 2000) .
These three perspectives on open-space acquisition (increased environmental consciousness, homeowner property value protection, and a changing legal environment) are not mutually exclusive and are probably mutually reinforcing. All three perspectives are consistent with observed behaviors and outcomes. Empirically, just as in the literature on exclusionary zoning, there is no a priori way to distinguish the underlying motivations of municipal actors (Bogart 1993) . Indeed, explaining municipal policies requires some prior theoretical perspective. We recognize that there is some level of methodological difference across disciplines in studying and explaining local government behavior. Our purpose in this article is to offer evidence consistent with our understanding that local government open-space policies are reflective of the real estate interests of existing homeowners. Thus, preservation of open space can mean that the apparently "neutral" policy objective of environmental protection may have been co-opted for more pecuniary and parochial interests.
To develop our theoretical basis of municipal behavior, we draw on the literature on localism in the environmental movement and on the exclusionary zoning literature. There is now a well-established literature-from scholars on both the "right" and the "left"-which sees in the manifestation of the environmental movement at local levels an attempt by middle-class property interests to use the rhetoric of environmentalism to protect and further their own amenity and landscape consumption values (Frieden 1979; R. Gottlieb 1993; Heiman 1988; McClaughry 1976; Rome 2001) . When suburban and exurban homeowners critique "sprawl" development, they somehow neglect to mention their own impacts upon the land.
Analogously, there is a well-established literature-also involving scholars from opposite ends of the ideological spectrum-which problematizes the localism of American land-use planning, whereby municipalities undertake plans and regulations to protect and further the property interests of existing homeowners, often engaging in exclusionary zoning (Babcock 1966; Bates and Santerre 1994; Fischel 2001 Fischel , 2004 P. Gottlieb 2006; H. M. Jacobs 1989; Ladd 1998; Levine 2006; Paulsen 2006; Pendall 2000; Williams 1971 ). Previous research on New Jersey in particular has documented the exclusionary nature of local land policies (Paulsen 2006; Rolleston 1987 ). In the Mt. Laurel decisions, the New Jersey Supreme Court has likewise criticized the parochial localism of municipalities' exclusionary zoning.
There is, of course, no consensus as to when municipal land planning tools become "exclusionary." By definition, all zoning is in some sense exclusionary in that it provides exclusive land-use districts. Local land-use policies can become exclusionary when adoption of restrictive measures reduces the supply and variety of housing types and densities available to lower-income (and, by extension, minority) households. Exclusion is a matter of degree. In states such as New Jersey with exclusionary zoning case law, principles such as "fair share" and "reasonable opportunity" assign an affirmative obligation upon municipalities. Courts adjudicate both the amount of land available for higher-density and/or affordable and/or multifamily housing as well as the permitting process of these types of developments. Municipal policies to preserve open space can potentially reduce the supply of land for more affordable and/or denser forms of housing and thereby displace growth to even further exurban areas, exacerbating the sprawl they claim to thwart. When land protection policies do not also make allowance for affordable development opportunities, the aggregate effect for a metropolitan region can be both sprawl and exclusion (Paulsen 2006) .
We turn now from the more general literature on municipal environmental and land policies to the more specific recent research on open-space preservation. Recent research has focused both on explaining open-space financing votes (Howell-Moroney 2004a , 2004b Kotchen and Powers 2006; Romero and Liserio 2002; Romero 2004; Solecki, Mason, and Martin 2004) and the actual open-space acquisition practices of local governments (Bates and Santerre 2001) . At a national level, Kotchen and Powers (2006) (2001) find open-space acquisition to be positively associated with income in Connecticut municipalities. These results are consistent with a wide range of local public finance studies, which find that amenity-providing local public goods (such as parks or open space) are income elastic across households and across communities (Borcherding and Deacon 1972) . Kotchen and Powers (2006) also tested the variable "homeowners" (percentage of housing units that are owner occupied) as a test of the general hypothesis that homeowners are a dominant faction in local land-use planning regimes. Their results appear inconsistent across national-and statelevel samples and whether a referendum was held or received voter support. Places with higher rates of homeownership were more likely to see ballot measures for open space. In the national-level regression, a higher percentage of homeowners, however, also reduced the probability of passing an open-space financing referendum. Because they control for different financing methods, we alternatively interpret their results to show that if homeowners bear the full financial burden of preserving open space through higher property taxes, they are less likely to vote for additional open-space preservation. We argue that homeowners are sensitive to the "tax price" of open-space preservation-how much additional preservation efforts will cost in terms of additional taxes paid.
A debate has emerged in the literature (with no apparent consensus) as to the extent to which land-use, land-use change, and density variables explain the existence of and voting on open-space ballot measures. For example, Kotchen and Powers (2006) find that population growth rates are not significantly related to open-space measures at the national level, which is inconsistent with the finding from other state-level analyses (Bates and Santerre 2001; Solecki, Mason, and Martin 2004) . Measurement issues and the spatial unit of analysis likely lie behind these different results. Romero and Liserio (2002) argue that sprawl (proxied by low population density) does not explain ballot measures, which they see as better explained as being adopted in wealthier and less diverse communities. In contrast, Howell-Moroney (2004b) argues that, at least in mid-Atlantic states such as Pennsylvania and New Jersey, open-space ballot measures were explained by low density and loss of open-space lands to development.
Most national-level studies are problematic because the measures obscure large differences in types of places and types of municipalities, and the fact that some states (like New Jersey) have municipal structures where all land is incorporated and municipal boundaries are fixed. In other states, municipalities are larger or are able to annex undeveloped land. If development is deflected outside of an existing municipal boundary in New Jersey, it would show up in the population growth and density figures of the neighboring municipality. In other states, however, this new growth might be annexed into the existing municipality. In both cases, growth may be at the same rates and same densities but would show different results in a cross-section of municipalities and lead to different interpretations of the effect of population growth and development densities on open-space policies. The trade-off in terms of research strategies is that while national level studies allow generalization about trends, more detailed analyses in (a) particular state(s) allow for a richer specification of location-specific policies and institutions. This present research on New Jersey also allows use of high-quality land-use data to measure net development densities and accurate measurements of lands available for development and actual loss of acres to development, while controlling for the unique public finance structure in the state.
Open-Space Preservation in New Jersey
The New Jersey Green Acres Program was created in 1961 with a $60 million bond issue to fund state land acquisition and matching grants to local municipalities (Foresta 1981) . Between 1961 and 1995, voters In 1989, state legislation enabled municipalities and counties to levy their own open-space taxes. Currently, all 21 counties and 218 municipalities levy such a tax. As a result of the 1998 GSPT Act, municipalities that levy an open-space tax and prepare a formal "Open Space and Recreation Plan" qualify for matching funds from the GSPT for 50% of land-acquisition costs. Moreover, they are eligible to receive these funds in a block grant to draw upon when needed. Previously, municipalities had to apply to the state for funding for each parcel-a time-consuming process that could frustrate efforts to provide rapid financing when faced with a development proposal. The GSPT also provides for the matching grant to be increased to 75% for "urban aid" municipalities to encourage poorer urban areas to acquire land. Figure 1 shows the number of successful municipal and county referenda on open-space taxes by year. Although specifically enabled since 1989, the number of referenda began to increase in 1996 in anticipation of increased and dedicated funding. Although New Jersey municipalities have been preserving land for over 40 years, the passage of the GSPT funding represents a distinct policy shift that serves as the basis of empirical work in later sections. The two regimes of open-space preservation are therefore before and after the passage of the GSPT.
Data and Research Design
The research presented in this article consists of three elements. First, following Solecki, Mason, and Martin (2004) and Kotchen and Powers (2006) , we model the variation in municipal voting behavior on open-space preservation funding referenda. In this case, we utilize the statewide constitutional amendment referendum in 1998 to dedicate $1 billion in funding through the GSPT. The purpose of this analysis is to examine the demographic and fiscal factors associated with increased support for dedicated open-space funding.
In section 6, we follow Bates and Santerre's (2001) work in Connecticut by examining the actual preservation policies of municipalities. While voters may vote in general for additional open-space funding, actual expenditure of funds for acquisition to implement these policies represents the outcome of local political processes. We will examine the variation in the amount of land preserved (on a per capita basis) by municipalities. As mentioned above, the GSPT changed the incentive structure as of 1998, effectively reducing the price to municipalities of preservation through a 50% match. We model municipal open-space preservation efforts before and after the policy change.
In keeping with previous research discussed above, we model both voter support for open-space funding and actual municipal open-space acquisition patterns as a function of the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of residents, their recent land development and population growth pressures, and the fiscal and policy environment.
In section 7, we raise the question as to whether open-space preservation policies might serve as a substitute for or complement to exclusionary landuse policies. First, we examine the relationship between municipalities' open-space acquisition efforts and their affordable housing obligations. Second, we examine the characteristics of parcels acquired for open space to identify the extent to which municipal acquisition targets land that has sewer service available and/or is zoned for higher-density development.
For each municipality, consistently interpreted, high-quality digital landuse data from the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection are 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
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Increase/continuation New bond passed available for the years 1986 and 1995. Using geographic information system (GIS), we can consistently measure the development pressure (or level of development) in a municipality by calculating the percentage of potentially developable land that has already been developed for urban uses. Potentially developable land excludes land in wetlands, hydric soils, and slopes greater than 15%. We also measure population density more accurately as the municipal population divided by the amount of land actually developed for urbanized uses. These two measures provide a more accurate characterization of actual landscape development patterns than do simple Census-based population density measures. Because our land-use data are only available for these specific years, we utilize socioeconomic and demographic data from as close to these years as possible, even when these dates do not perfectly overlap important policy dates.
For each municipality, we also measure the distance to either Philadelphia or New York, the two closest major cities, as drivers of employment. In many land-use studies, distance to major employment centers measures an important driver of land-use change. In the case of New Jersey, rather than being a "monocentric" state, growth pressures come from either Philadelphia or New York. In previous research, Bates and Santerre (2001) find that distance to the nearest major central city significantly explains preservation efforts. As land values and development pressures in New Jersey are also influenced by access to highways, we calculate for each municipality the distance to the nearest major highway interchange. We note that previous studies on actual preservation efforts have employed distance variables as explanatory variables, while studies focusing on voting on open-space referenda have not. Anticipating our results, we do find that distance to a highway interchange is positive and significant in predicting yes votes on open-space referenda.
Because fiscal policy variables can be important in explaining local public policies, we measure the per capita property tax base for each municipality. Our hypothesis is that municipalities with greater fiscal capacity (higher tax base per capita) might have more financial resources for acquiring open space.
New Jersey has two regional environmental policy frameworks that might influence municipal open-space preservation policies. Municipalities along the coast are subject to the Coastal Area Facilities Review Act (CAFRA), and many municipalities in the southern part of the state are subject to the New Jersey Pinelands Commission. In both areas, additional levels of review are required for land development proposals, and municipal plans and zoning policies are reviewed for consistency with regional environmental mandates. State and regional policies and funding are heavily directed toward environmental protection and land preservation in these areas. We expect that municipalities in these areas will be less aggressive with local open-space preservation because state and regional policies already adequately address preservation needs. In this regard, we hypothesize that local preservation efforts and preservation by higher levels of government (county, state, federal) are substitutes. This is contrary to Solecki, Mason, and Martin (2004) , who interpret lower levels of support for preservation in these areas of New Jersey as reflecting some sort of "antigovernment" ideology.
Previous research on New Jersey (Rolleston 1987) indicated that local land policies might be influenced by the racial composition of neighboring municipalities, as municipalities use low-density zoning to screen out minority residents. Thus, we measure the racial composition of a municipality relative to its neighbors. To construct this measure, we compute a distance-weighted average of all neighboring municipalities' percentage of Black residents. We then divide each municipality's percentage of Black with the distance-weighted average of its neighbors. Municipalities with a score greater than 1 contain a higher percentage of African-American residents than do their neighbors, while municipalities with scores less than 1 contain a smaller percentage than their neighbors. This measure enables a specific test for any explicitly racially exclusionary motive in open-space preservation.
Other demographic variables include the percentage of housing units owner occupied, per capita income, population growth rates, percentage of the population over age 65, and median housing unit age. As a proxy for land prices in each county, we utilize the average price per acre of agricultural land from the 1987 and 1997 Census of Agriculture. See Appendix A for a detailed table of all the variables and Appendix B for descriptive statistics.
Explaining Municipal Voting Patterns on Open-Space Preservation
In this section, we examine voting patterns at the municipal level in the 1998 state referenda to establish a dedicated source of $1 billion in openspace preservation funding. In our regression analysis, the dependent variable is the proportion, by municipality, of those voting yes in the 1998 referenda. (Yes votes are measured as a percentage of all who voted on the referenda question, rather than all those voting in that election.) Regression results are shown in Table 1 .
The results are generally consistent with previous research with a few notable differences. As expected, communities with higher percentages of "homevoters" (homeowners) are associated with increased voter support for statewide open-space funding. While Kotchen and Powers (2006) find that a higher percentage of homeowners reduces support for open-space funding, it is important to note that their study looked at local open-space referenda where local homeowners would have to pay for open space through higher property taxes. In the statewide New Jersey referendum, homeowners do not bear the full burden of the costs of preservation, as funding is distributed statewide and is funded by sales taxes, not property taxes. Homeowners are indeed sensitive to the tax price of open-space acquisition. In this case, homeowners' latent "demand" for open space is expressed when a portion of the cost of acquisition is shifted to others.
As in most studies, higher income was associated with increased likelihood to vote for additional funding. Those municipalities with faster rates of growth in the preceding period (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) were associated with a Romero and Liserio's (2002) national analysis; they find that density was not statistically significant in explaining either the appearance of open-space measures or their success. We find that higher municipal densities were associated with increased support for open-space preservation funding in New Jersey. We attribute these results to the fact that an increased matching grant (up to 75%) for urban municipalities provided the incentive for voters in urban municipalities to believe that some benefit would also occur in their own communities. This might suggest that at a state level, proponents who wish to secure voter approval for additional open-space financing might offer additional financial incentives to urban voters. A second interpretation of these results could be that urban voters also see positive benefits in statewide open-space programs even if not directly benefiting themselves and that, therefore, preservation efforts have positive spillover effects across municipal boundaries. This suggests the need for finance at higher levels of government rather than reliance only on local finance.
As predicted, the signs on the Pineland and CAFRA municipalities are significant and negative. Residents of municipalities subject to stricter environmental protection and regional planning mandates feel less need for additional local open-space preservation through dedicated financing. In these areas, there is less land available for development and less overall development pressure because of stricter regulations. Residents in these communities may not feel that development and growth are problems or may believe that existing regulations provide adequate land protection already. We interpret this as a substitution effect rather than an antienvironmental or antigovernment effect, and it is consistent with the argument that regulatory measures and preservation through acquisition can be substitutes. This agrees with the analysis that voters believe that regulatory approaches are no longer adequate in preserving the desired amount of land.
It is also worth noting that none of our variables measuring explicit fiscal or racial motivations in open-space preservation are significant. While voting for additional open-space preservation funding at a state level is a reaction to growth and development pressures (the coefficient on population growth rates is significant and positive), it is a generalized reaction to growth, rather than based in explicitly racial or fiscal motivations.
Explaining Municipal Open-Space Acquisition Behavior
Voting on statewide referenda to create dedicated state funding for open space represents one way local voters express preferences for additional open-space protection. In this section, we estimate regressions to explain the actual open-space acquisition behavior of municipalities. Because acquisition efforts are undertaken by municipal governments, we would expect these efforts to reflect the policy interests of local residents and local politics. We examine acquisition during two distinct time periods-from 1986 to 1995 and from 1995 to 2003-or roughly before and after the state referendum. We model these two time periods to estimate the changes in municipal behavior in response to a changing state policy environment. As The dependent variable is the amount of land preserved on a per capita basis during each time period. We use land on a per capita basis, following Bates and Santerre (2001) and in keeping with standard local public finance analysis. One complication for standard linear regression techniques is that this variable is censored because we do not observe the amount of open space preserved by municipalities that do not preserve any land. Because the data are left censored, the objective function is "kinked," making standard regression techniques biased. Therefore, we use the Tobit regression technique, utilizing maximum likelihood estimation. The interpretation of coefficients in a Tobit model is complicated. For nonzero observations, the interpretation of the coefficients is the same as in ordinary least squares regressions: the marginal effect on the dependent variable of each independent variable. However, if one wants to use the coefficients as measuring the "true" marginal effect over all observations, it would only be relative to a "latent" dependent variable. We could think of our latent dependent variable in this case as "willingness to preserve open space." The Tobit regression results are presented in Table 2 , with results from 1986 to 1995 on the left side and from 1995 to 2003 on the right side. Note: CAFRA = Coastal Area Facilities Review Act. LR = Likelihood Ratio Prob = Probability **Significant at the 5% level. *Significant at the 10% level.
In both time periods, population growth rates are significant and positive, indicating that municipalities that saw more rapid growth showed a higher willingness to preserve open space with local funds. This is consistent with the hypothesis that open-space preservation efforts are undertaken in response to local population growth and development pressure. We also find that income is significant and positive in both time periods, indicating an income-elastic demand for open space, also consistent with previous studies.
As hypothesized, the determinants of municipal open-space preservation changed over the two time periods, as the number of municipalities preserving open space dramatically increased due to the statewide policy changes of increased availability of funding mechanisms to increase the ability of local preservation.
During the 1986-1995 time period, the only two other significant variables (other than population growth rate and income) are the percentage of housing units owner occupied and municipal population density. Population density now shows the expected negative sign, with more densely populated areas protecting less open space on a per capita basis or less dense areas protecting more land on a per capita basis.
Prior to the availability of matching funds from the state government, homeowners faced the full cost of local open-space preservation in the form of additional property taxes. Thus, all other things being equal, higher rates of homeownership were associated with lower willingness to preserve open space. The restrictive zoning favored by homevoters could substitute for open-space preservation by requiring each new household to provide private open space through large minimum lot requirements. In communities with high degrees of owner-occupied housing, there may have been no need for additional open-space preservation through local funding, since zoning already reduced development densities. Before state matching funds, owneroccupiers were less supportive of purchasing open space, presumably because of the additional tax burden.
However, as shown above, high homeownership rates were associated with increased voter support for dedicated funding at the state level. The effect of state matching funds is to reduce the marginal cost of preservation to local property taxpayers, as local taxpayers only paid approximately half of the costs of acquisition efforts. Therefore, after the GSPT (our second time period), the owner-occupied housing variable is no longer statistically significant. Once the financial incentives are different, the negative impact of open-space funding on homeowners through increased property taxes is balanced by the positive impact of open-space preservation on property values.
In comparison with the first time period before the GSPT, the variables that become statistically significant in the second period measure land use and the institutional mechanisms of open-space preservation. In the later time period, the negative coefficient on percentage developed indicates that municipalities with more undeveloped land had a greater willingness to acquire open space. Municipalities in the Pineland region were less willing to preserve land (on a per capita basis) because regulatory measures already protect vulnerable landscapes.
The positive coefficients on nonlocal acquisition (acquisition by county and state governments inside the borders of the municipality) indicate that nonlocal acquisition serves as a supplement to local acquisition efforts: As the level and pace of nonlocal acquisition are higher, a municipality is more willing to preserve additional lands with its own funds. Our complementary effect is contrary to Bates and Santerre (2001) , who find that nonlocal preservation substitutes for (or crowds out) local acquisition efforts in Connecticut. We suspect that the difference lies in the financing mechanism in New Jersey, because matching grant programs encourage additional municipal acquisition without municipalities facing the full costs. Our results suggest that municipalities are clearly responsive to financial and policy instruments in their local open-space preservation efforts.
Is Open-Space Preservation Exclusionary?
The above analyses on voting and acquisition behavior, while indicating that open-space preservation policies are associated with higher income areas, faster rates of population growth, and in response to homeowners' concerns to protect property interests, show no evidence of explicitly exclusionary motives. However, as we have argued, open-space preservation may still serve as a complement or supplement to other local exclusionary policies if it is utilized by wealthier communities to obviate their needs to provide affordable housing and/or if municipalities disproportionately target lands able to accommodate higher-density development for open-space preservation. If municipalities have large amounts of potentially developable land available, they could presumably provide some amount of land for affordable housing development, while also preserving large amounts of open space. If they did so, then open-space preservation would not necessarily be exclusionary but would represent an attempt to balance between growth and preservation needs.
The link between open-space preservation and affordable housing is not simply an "academic" concern. The New Jersey Supreme Court recently dealt with a case involving just such a policy "trade-off." In December 2006, the court decided a case involving a township's use of eminent domain authority to acquire land under its open-space acquisition program-land that had already been granted development approval for houses (Mount Laurel Township v. MiPro Homes, L.L.C. 188 N.J. 531; 910 A.2d 617 [2006] , cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3167 [U.S. Oct. 1, 2007] ).
To explore the exclusionary effects of open-space policies, we employ two further layers of analyses. First, we investigate the relationship between acquisition practices and the provision of local affordable housing. Second, we examine whether locally preserved open space is targeted toward areas planned for higher-density development. The series of Mt. Laurel court cases in the 1970s and 1980s established the fair share doctrine: "Every . . . municipality must, by its land-use regulations, presumptively make realistically possible an appropriate variety and choice of housing . . . to the extent of the municipality's fair share of the present and prospective regional need therefore" (So. Burlington Cty. NAACP v Tp. of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d at 724 [1975 ], cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 [1975 ). However, once a municipality has satisfied its fair share obligations, it may engage in "large-lot and open area zoning, that would maintain its beauty and communal character" (So. Burlington Cty. NAACP v Tp. of Mt. Laurel 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d at 421 [1983] ).
The Fair Housing Act of 1985 established the Council on Affordable Housing (COAH) as an implementation of the court mandates. COAH calculates the number of affordable units a municipality is responsible to produce. Municipalities that submit plans to meet their current and future need can be certified by COAH and be exempt from developer-initiated lawsuits. However, municipalities may "transfer" up to half of their affordable-unit obligations to "receiving" municipalities in exchange for negotiated payments, called "Regional Contribution Agreements." In this way, "sending" municipalities (generally suburban and rural) may sell up to half of their affordable housing obligations 1 (Hughes and McGuire 1991) . We argue that if municipalities are sending their affordable housing obligations outside of the municipality while simultaneously preserving open space, this constitutes evidence consistent with exclusionary policies. To test this, we examine data from COAH on the number of total regional affordable units transferred since the 1985 Fair Housing Act. Since 1985, 107 municipalities have sent their affordable housing obligations to 45 receiving municipalities. Using a simple correlation analysis (n = 107), we find a statistically significant and positive correlation (r = 0.2518) between the amount of local open-space acquisition (on a per capita basis) and the number of affordable housing units sent. These results are suggestive of efforts to exclude lower-income affordable housing in municipalities that are also preserving large amounts of open space.
In the second line of analysis, we examine the characteristics of actual parcels acquired by local government to see if parcels are targeted that could serve higher-density development. As an indicator of the capacity of land to support development, we use areas that are serviced by public sewers. Indeed, sewer service is at the center of much debate in New Jersey concerning preserving open space and managing growth (Paulsen 2006) . If land is serviced by sewers, it can be developed at higher densities and is usually so designated on state and regional land-use plans. If municipalities have planned for sewer service to be available, that is an indication that these lands were once planned for development to meet forecasted growth needs. If, as we hypothesize, municipalities engage in preservation as a tactic to thwart overall development and particularly higher-density development, then their acquisition efforts would disproportionately target land in sewer service areas.
To examine this question, we use a GIS database of all land acquired through the Green Acres Program through 2003. These digital data at the parcel level include information on whether the land was acquired by municipal, county, or state governments or by a nonprofit land trust. We combine this parcel-level data with a statewide layer of approved sewer service areas from the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. Using overlay analysis, we can determine whether parcels acquired using Green Acres funding were located within sewer service areas. Table 3 presents the results, which measure the percentage of land acquired for open-space preservation in sewer service areas by acquiring agent.
We find that 42% of all municipal land acquisitions with state matching funds occurred within sewer service areas, while only 11% of nonprofit and 5% of state acquisitions were in sewer service areas. These differences are statistically significant at the 1% level. Therefore, relative to state and nonprofit acquisition, municipalities disproportionately target areas serviced by sewers in their acquisition practices. Nonprofit and state acquisitions are less tied to local politics, and therefore, they can focus on regionally important environmental objectives.
To adjust these measures to control for total land area, we create an index of sewered land preservation intensity, measured as the percentage of acquisitions in sewered areas divided by the percentage of the land area that is sewered. A score greater than 1 would indicate that relatively more acquisition was occurring in sewered areas. For example, if 20% of open-space acquisitions were in sewered areas, while sewered areas represented only 10% of the land area of the municipality, an index score of 2 would indicate that sewered areas were disproportionately targeted for acquisition.
We calculated this index (shown in the third column in Table 3 ) for acquisitions at the state, nonprofit and municipal level. As nonprofits are active over the whole state, we calculated total land area as comprising the whole state and measured total nonprofit acquisitions throughout the state. For municipalities, we calculate the index only for those 289 municipalities that had both sewer service areas and local acquisition of open space.
Even controlling for land area, municipalities tend to disproportionately target areas serviced with sewers for acquisition, while state government and nonprofit actors tend to target areas without sewer service available. At a minimum, these findings indicate that municipalities are not adequately integrating open-space preservation planning with their infrastructure planning. Land with sewer services is generally more expensive because it can support more development, and thus fiscal resources for open-space preservation may be inefficiently used. However, we think this evidence suggests a municipal policy to use open-space preservation to thwart development.
Discussion and Policy Recommendations
New Jersey is often heralded as a leader in both open-space protection and in restrictions on municipal exclusionary zoning. The evidence in this article, however, suggests that those two important state policy goals may be in conflict. Municipalities may be using the policy objectives and mechanisms of one policy-open-space preservation-to thwart or evade their fair share affordable housing obligations. All states face the competing challenges of preserving lands and protecting landscapes, while also needing to ensure an adequate supply of affordable and/or higher-density housing. While some areas-notably Oregon-have responded with strong regional and preserve open spaces are sensitive to the particular financial and institutional mechanisms involved. Prior to a dedicated source of funding from state sales taxes and bond revenues, few municipalities had dedicated taxes to preserve open space. However, after the availability of streamlined access to dedicated funds and 50% matching grants, there was a rapid proliferation of preservation efforts. Advocates for increased funding for open-space preservation in other states can learn that dedicated state funding sources may be necessary. Because open-space acquisition efforts by municipalities provide important environmental and aesthetic services to nonresidents and because homeowner-voters who control local politics are sensitive to additional property taxes, there is a rationale for sources of funding at higher levels of government. In the case of New Jersey, the 50% matching grant lowered to property-tax cost of acquiring open-space to local residents enough that they were willing to impose additional taxes for open-space preservation.
Our second recommendation derives from the positive support for openspace preservation from urban residents, which also relates to addressing some of the equity concerns in open-space funding. Urban residents were supportive of the state referenda to dedicate $1 billion in funding. We attribute this difference to the increased matching percentage (75%) available to urban municipalities and to the recognition of the importance of open-space preservation. Other states seeking to preserve open spaces may gain broader political support (and increase regional equity) with similar matching grant incentive structures.
Our third recommendation involves the competing state policy objectives evidenced in this article. Municipalities in New Jersey can have their affordable housing plans certified by COAH and can have their open-space plans approved by the Green Acres Program, but no state agency evaluates municipal plans for consistency across these two policy areas. While it may not always be advantageous to mandate state oversight or certification of all municipal policies, when important state policy objectives and large amounts of state funding are at stake, better interagency coordination would seem warranted. There are also a number of New Jersey specific reforms that could be made to reduce the possibility that open-space preservation functions as exclusionary zoning, including elimination of the ability of municipalities to "send" away their affordable housing obligations or providing extra financial incentives to municipalities that do meet affordability targets. 1986-1995 (continued) 
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